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The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants in all criminal prosecutions
the right to the assistance of counsel.' The right to counsel is essential to the
working of the criminal justice system, as the attorney must present the defen-
dant's case and provide guidance throughout the State's proceedings against
the defendant.2 Indeed, "[tihe very premise of our adversary system of criminal
justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."
3
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel not only enables the criminal justice
system to operate, it also permits a criminal defendant to secure constitutional
rights. As Illinois Supreme Court Justice William Schaefer once wrote: "Of all
the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is
by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he
may have."4
While the Supreme Court has expanded the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel,5 the criminal justice system has failed to provide effective legal
assistance to indigent criminal defendants.' Reformers who study indigent
defense systems uniformly note that insufficient funding of defense services
prevents those systems from providing effective representation.' The disjunc-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
2. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (criminal defendant "requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him").
3. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
4. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,223-27 (1967) (describing stages in adversary process
requiring presence of counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (extending right to counsel to capital
cases).
6. See infra Part I.
7. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESEN-
TATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 11-24, 56-60 (1982) (assessing inadequate funding of
defense services in various states) [hereinafter LEFSTEIN, DEFENSE SERVICES]; Suzanne E. Mounts, Public
Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIs. L. REV. 473,
483 ("[A]Imost every study made of defender programs has noted very serious shortcomings that are
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tion between the formal rights of indigent criminal defendants and the availabil-
ity of effective attorneys to vindicate those rights has led to increased claims
of inadequate representation.8 For legal reformers, how to address the growing
crisis in indigent defense services-specifically, what efforts should be taken
and who should take them-is a matter of intense debate. Some urge the legal
profession to address the problem privately, either through raising funds for
defense services 9 or by increasing its pro bono commitment."0 Others insist
that the problem is a "political question" that only the legislature can ad-
dress."
This Note argues that litigation seeking a structural injunction-a detailed
remedial order providing affirmative relief-to improve state systems for
providing indigent defense services is necessary to promote compliance with
the requirements of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Judges developed
the structural injunction as a remedial tool for implementing reform decrees in
institutional litigation. The structural injunction "operates through the for-
ward-looking mandatory injunction but assumes a relatively intrusive form, a
more or less detailed order whose prescriptions displace significant areas of
defendants' discretion ... and often demands an active, administrative role for
the judge."' 2
Part I of the Note sketches the contours of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and outlines the systemic inadequacies plaguing existing indigent
defense systems. Part II criticizes the current legal system's reliance on
post-conviction review of individual cases to address ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Judges have been reluctant to abandon this case-by-case review
in favor of prospective structural reform of indigent criminal defense systems.
traceable directly to lack of funds.").
8. See, e.g., James A. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems,
19 ARIz. L. REV. 443, 445 n.8 (1977) (survey of number of claims of incompetent counsel in reported
opinions in federal appeals courts shows 262% increase in number of claims from 1963-65 to 1969-71);
John K. Van de Kamp, The Right to Counsel: Constitutional Imperatives in Criminal Cases, 19 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 329, 330 (1985) (noting increasing frequency with which criminal defendants complain about
counsel).
9. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 681-82 (1986).
. 10. Jerry L. Anderson, Court-Appointed Counsel: The Constitutionaliy of Uncompensated Conscription,
3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1990).
11. SeeinfraPartllI.C.1, especially note 137 and accompanying text. For an explanation of the political
question doctrine, which dictates that courts lack the institutional capacity to address certain constitutional
questions, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
12. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CrrIzEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 151 (1983);
see also OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7, 91-93 (1978) (structural injunction initiates
lengthy relationship between judge and institution). In Part III.A, this Note defines the structural injunction
in greater detail and describes its application in the ongoing litigation to reform Arkansas' prison system.
For a discussion of litigation as a way to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims, see Richard J.
Wilson, Litigative Approaches to Enforcing the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases,
14 N.YU. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 203 (1986).
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By describing ongoing litigation in Georgia, Part II presents a case study of
judicial opposition to such structural reform.
13
Part III presents the case for a structural injunction to reform indigent
defense systems and concludes with suggestions courts should consider when
structuring the remedial decree. It describes the salutary effect of the Arizona
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Smith,14 which provided clear instructions
for the provision of indigent services in Mohave County and resulted in in-
creased funding for those services. The Note argues that courts should employ
a similar technique of issuing reform guidelines with specific goals for the
provision of indigent defense services when the political branches are unwilling
to provide adequate funds.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT To COUNSEL AND THE
FAILURE OF EXISTING INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
A. The Scope of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Since the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama," which established the right
to counsel in death penalty cases, the Supreme Court has extended the right to
counsel to a number of criminal proceedings. Six years after Powell, the Court
expanded its holding by guaranteeing the right to counsel to any indigent
charged with a felony in a federal proceeding. 6 In 1963, Gideon v. Wain-
wright 7 extended the right to counsel in felony trials to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, in 1972, the Court
held that no defendant could be imprisoned, even for a misdemeanor conviction,
unless he had been provided counsel.'
Just as the Supreme Court has expanded the offenses for which the defen-
dant requires an attorney, it also has extended the right to counsel to various
"critical" pretrial stages, such as a custodial interrogation 9 and a lineup.20
The Court also has required that counsel be provided for the first level of
appeal.2" Although the right to counsel established in Powell did not entail
a right to effective representation, case law has since developed to guarantee
the defendant that right.'
13. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 896 E2d 479 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2562 (1990), petition for permission to appeal granted, 918 F.2d 888 (11th Cir.
1990), district court order vacated sub nom. Luckey v. Miller 929 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1991). This series
of decisions involved jurisdictional issues; the court has not yet evaluated the merits of plaintiffs' case.
14. 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
21. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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B. The Failure of Existing Indigent Defense Systems
The development of institutions to provide legal assistance to indigent
criminal defendants has closely followed the expansion of the right to coun-
sel.' Before Gideon, indigent defendants typically were represented by ap-
pointed attorneys serving without compensation or by volunteer agencies
providing legal assistance.a Gideon greatly increased the demand for attorneys
to represent indigent criminal defendants.s As a result of a variety of fac-
tors-the increase in criminal activity and corresponding rise in the number of
criminal defendants, the expansion of the right to counsel, the increasing com-
plexity of criminal defense, and the inexperience of many appointed attorneys
with such work-the demand for effective representation has never been
greater.2
Today there are three systems for providing counsel to indigent criminal
defendants: (1) the public defender system, in which a public or private non-
profit organization with full-time attorneys receives public funds for providing
representation; 27 (2) the assigned counsel system, which provides for the
judicial appointment and compensation of individual private attorneys who
represent indigent defendants as the need arises;' and (3) the contract system,
in which an individual attorney or a private law firm contracts with a govern-
ment funding source to represent indigent clients for a set fee.
29
Without sufficient funding, none of these systems can provide adequate
assistance to indigent criminal defendants." However, studies of indigent
defense systems consistently demonstrate that legal services provided to the
poor are inadequate as a result of underfunding 1l Identifying the various
problems afflicting the provision of defense services-heavy public defender
caseloads, inadequate compensation for contract attorneys and assigned counsel,
23. Suzanne E. Mounts& Richard J. Wilson, Systemsfor Providing Indigent Defense: An Introduction,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193, 197 (1986).
24. Id. at 197-98.
25. Klein, supra note 9, at 656. After Gideon, Congress passed the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1985 & Supp. 1991), toregulate the appointment of private attorneys to represent indigent criminal
defendants in U.S. district courts. The statute specifies fees for the appointed attorneys and procedures for
obtaining "investigative, expert, or other services necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).
26. State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 320-22 (W. Va. 1976); Robert L. Spangenberg,
We Are Still Not Defending the Poor Properly, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1989, at 10 (describing recent reform
efforts as inadequate). For a discussion of the difficulties criminal defense attorneys encounter in their
practice, see Symposium, Limitations on the Effectiveness of Criminal Defense Counsel: Legitimate Means
or "Chilling Wedges?." 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1779 (1988).
27. Klein, supra note 9, ht 656-57.
28. Anderson, supra note 10, at 503.
29. Meredith A. Nelson, Note, Quality Control for Indigent Defense Contracts, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1147,
1147 (1988) (calling for legislation to establish quality standards in award and administration of indigent
defense contracts).
30. See LEFSTEN, DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 7.
31. See id.; C. Anthony Friloux. Jr., EqualJustice Under the Law: A Myth. Not a Reality, 12 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 691 (1975); Joe Margulies, Resource Deprivation and the Right to Counsel, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 673, 678 (1989); Mounts, supra note 7; Mounts & Wilson, supra note 23, at 200.
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and a shortage of attorneys to represent criminal defendants in capital and
misdemeanor cases-Professor Lefstein stated in 1986 that "[a]ll of these
problems stem from a lack of appropriated funds."32
The sharp disparity in funding for defense services as compared to other
criminal justice institutions 33 results in many deficiencies. Lacking sufficient
staff and resources, defense attorneys must ration their time and cannot ade-
quately prepare their cases. 4 Defense attorneys may be unable to investigate
their cases properly35 and to consult with their clients.36 The resulting lack
of information may lead attorneys to strike unfair and harmful pleas for their
clients when bargaining with the State.37 Similarly, they may not prepare
adequately for their clients' sentencing hearings.3 In some jurisdictions, the
lack of adequate funding and resources not only precludes attorneys from
thoroughly preparing to assist clients, but also prevents them from accompany-
ing clients during critical stages of the adversary process, despite the Supreme
Court's explicit requirement to the contrary.
39
Lack of funding may also pressure attorneys to plead cases as quickly as
possible in an effort to manage their caseload4  Finally, within an office re-
sponsible for representing indigent defendants, there is little opportunity for new
attorneys to receive adequate training and supervision, which compromises the
quality of service they provide.
4 1
32. Norman Lefstein, Keynote Address, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 9 (1986).
33. A recent Bureau of Justice Statistics survey reports that public defense received $1.05 billion of
government (local, state, and federal) criminal justice funds; prosecution services received $3.23 billion;
corrections, $13.03 billion; and police services, $22.01 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1987, at 2 tbl. 1.1 (1988); see also Klein, supra note 9, at 675 ("The
prosecution receives almost four times the amount of funds spent by state and local governments on indigent
defense."); Spangenberg, supra note 26 (showing recent increases in expenditures have not matched
indigents' demand for defense attorneys, especially with increasing number of drug arrests).
34. Klein, supra note 9, at 678-79; Nancy Albert-Goldberg et al., Developing Strategies for Resolving
Workload Problems and Controlling Caseloads 9 (unpublished report by Ab Associates, Inc., on file with
author).
35. LEFsTEIN, DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 7, at 56; Norman Lefstein, Financing the Right to
Counsel: A National Perspective, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 391 (1985); Margulies, supra note 31, at 679-80;
Sheldon Portman, Financing the Right to Counsel: A View From a Local Public Defender, 19 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 363,364-65 (1985) (California defense attorneys lack time to conduct proper investigation). In Part
II.B, this Note argues that inadequate investigation by the defense attorney violates the defendant's
constitutional right to counsel.
36. Klein, supra note 9, at 667-69.
37. Id. at 669-73.
38. Id. at 673-75.
39. Margulies, supra note 31, at 680.
40. See, e.g., Robert L. Spangenberg et al., Overview of the Fulton County, Georgia Indigent Defense
System 25-26 (October 1990) (unpublished report, on file with author) [hereinafter Spangenberg Report].
41. Id. at 24, 28, 43.
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II. JUDICIAL OPPOSITION TO STRUCTURAL REFORM OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
Despite the systemic problems hampering the provision of indigent defense
services, courts generally reject litigation seeking to reform indigent defense
systems. Instead, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are adjudicated on a
post-conviction case-by-case basis. The post-conviction approach fails to
remedy errors of omission resulting from staff and resource shortages. It may
correct flagrant errors, but it cannot reach claims never brought and strategies
never used. Because claims are case specific, the use of this approach precludes
criminal defendants from raising structural challenges to improve indigent
defense systems. As Section B demonstrates, courts have erected jurisdictional
barriers to adjudicating cases seeking to reform defense systems."2
A. Establishing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Currently, courts employ a case-by-case approach to evaluate ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. The cases are adjudicated in one of two ways
depending on the particular allegation of inadequacy. In cases involving the
state's obligation to provide attorneys to indigent defendants and the state's
regulation of that process, the Supreme Court has adopted what one commenta-
tor calls a "systemic" approach to the right to counsel.43 That is, if the harm
stems from state action or from denial of the right to counsel at a critical stage,
the appellate court decides the case by applying a per se rule rather than by
inquiring into the specific facts of the defendant's case."4
Alternatively, if the harm results from errors committed by the defendant's
attorney, the appellate court reviews the facts to determine whether the errors
prejudiced the outcome of the case. Here, the defendant bears the burden of
meeting the two-prong test outlined in Strickland v. Washington.a5 In a
post-conviction appeal, the defendant must show that his trial attorney's perfor-
mance was deficient and that this inadequate performance prejudiced his case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Cronic,"6 decided
the same day as Strickland, that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of
42. See, e.g., Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618, 619-20 (1lth Cir. 1991) (summarizing case history).
43. Margulies, supra note 31, at 676.
44. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). Automatic reversal is appropriate, for example,
when counsel is denied at a critical stage in the criminal proceeding, when the attorney suffers from a clear
conflict of interest and is not removed from the case, and when the defendant faces prejudicial circumstances
that make "it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance." Id. at 661.
45. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
46. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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counsel must demonstrate actual ineffectiveness to warrant Sixth Amendment
protection. 7
Strickland's reliance on post-conviction review to remedy systemic deficien-
cies provides no guarantee that indigent defendants will receive adequate
assistance of counsel. By requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the
ineffectiveness of counsel was prejudicial, the Strickland criteria tend to focus
on errors of commission; however, especially with overworked defense attor-
neys, ineffective assistance more often results from an attorney's errors of
omission.48
Strickland requires the defendant to demonstrate a direct connection
between the attorney's error and the defendant's conviction. However, in a case
involving an overworked defense attorney, the record is likely to be so sparse
that it conceals the information the defense attorney should have discovered and
presented on the defendant's behalf. Furthermore, reliance on post-conviction
review by an appellate court overlooks the extent to which effective counsel
can influence the entire trial process and thus the outcome of the case. Judge
Schwarzer explained: "The lifeless and fragmentary appellate record will
provide few insights into, and a poor perspective of counsel's knowledge of
the law, capacity to analyze and plan, and ability to conduct effective direct and
cross-examination of witnesses. This problem will be magnified to the extent
that the lawyer was incompetent.
49
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the dangers of attempting to measure
the injury to a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights based on reviewing an
appellate transcript in other effectiveness-of-counsel cases. These cases not only
create an affirmative governmental duty to guarantee that the defendant has
counsel at the critical stages of the adversary proceeding, they also prevent the
state from interfering with the attorney's representation of her client." For
example, in Holloway v. Arkansas t5 1 in which a public defender was com-
pelled to represent several defendants with conflicting interests in the same
case, Chief Justice Burger stated that "an inquiry into a claim of harmless error
here would require ... unguided speculation. '52
47. In Cronic, the Supreme Court held that the circumstances surrounding the defendant's representa-
tion-that counsel was given only 25 days to prepare for trial, that he had never tried a criminal case, that
the charges were complex-did notjustify a presumption of ineffectiveness. Instead, defendant was required
to show the specific instances in which counsel's actual performance at trial constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id.
48. See supra Part I.B.
49. William NV. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel--The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 643 (1980).
50. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (trial judge's ruling preventing defendant
from consulting with attorney during overnight recess improperly denied defendant access to counsel);
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (invalidating New York statute allowing trial judge to decline
to hear closing arguments).
51. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
52. Id. at 491.
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In conflict of interest cases, the Court adopts a per se rule because the
"impairments preclude counsel from doing many things that might otherwise
be done. It is impossible to reconstruct, much less to evaluate, what these things
were. It also wastes the court's time to attempt to do so. '53 The same rationale
should apply to judicial scrutiny of cases alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel resulting from the state's failure to provide adequate defense services
for indigents.
In addition, the deficiencies in the indigent defense system result from the
state's failure to fund these systems. Whereas the injury from a state-imposed
conflict of interest is inflicted during the criminal defendant's trial, the damage
caused by inadequate funding results from state action at an earlier stage in the
process-the legislature's failure to allocate sufficient funding for the indigent
defense system. Nevertheless, state action is the source of error in both situa-
tions. If inadequate funding causes the absence of counsel at a critical stage in
the adversary process, then it constitutes systemic error mandating per se
reversal. The same standard should apply when insufficient funding prevents
the defense attorney from providing effective representation.
Moreover, regardless of whether the attorney's error is one of omission or
commission, Strickland forces the indigent defendant to challenge trial counsel's
conduct without the assistance of counsel. Although Douglas v. California54
guarantees the defendant appointed counsel on the first appeal, Ross v.
Moffit 5 limits the right to that appeal alone. As an indigent defendant is
likely to have the same attorney for the appeal as she had at trial, she is not
in a position to challenge appointed counsel's effectiveness on appeal. On
collateral attack, she must challenge trial counsel's effectiveness without a
lawyer, even though "there are few situations in which a defendant needs
assistance of counsel more direly ... ."56 After Strickland, the convicted
defendant is required to prepare pleadings that convince the district court to
hold a hearing "and then, perhaps with counsel assigned, prove not only that
his attorney was incompetent but that the incompetence produced the convic-
tion."57
Finally, a case-by-case approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims
prevents courts from considering systemic issues. An individual alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel in her case cannot assert the claims of other
indigent defendants. The public defender's lack of adequate resources is likely
to affect each client's case differently. Reliance on post-conviction remedies
ignores the source of Sixth Amendment deficiencies in indigent defense services
and thus misdirects remedial efforts by failing to consider the average or typical
53. Brief for Respondent at 20, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (No. 82-660).
54. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
55. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
56. Brief for Respondent at 62-63, Croitic (No. 82-660).
57. Id. at 63 (citations omitted).
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case. This failure wastes judicial resources on redundant inquiries. A more
sensible way to solve ineffective assistance of counsel problems is to address
their causes rather than their symptoms.
B. Luckey v. Miller: Dissecting the Legal System's Opposition to Structural
Reform of Indigent Defense Systems
The current crisis in Georgia's indigent defense system reveals the extent
to which existing legal remedies fail to address systemic flaws in the represen-
tation of poor criminal defendants.58 Georgia's system presents a case study
of how insufficient funding undermines indigent defense services and produces
violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Since 1986, a group of
Georgia attorneys have maintained a class action to reform the state's indigent
defense system. Luckey v. Miller's59 procedural history presents in microcosm
the legal barriers courts have erected to bar lawsuits seeking to address systemic
deficiencies in indigent defense services.60
1. Georgia's Indigent Defense System
Although Georgia has declared its intention to "provide the constitutional
guarantees of the right to counsel and equal access to the courts to all its
citizens in criminal cases, ' 61 the state's reliance on a county-by-county system
to furnish indigent defense services has proven inadequate. Georgia assigns its
criminal courts the task of "provid[ing] for the representation of indigent
persons in criminal proceedings ...."62 About 66% of the counties rely on
court-appointed attorneys to represent indigents, 23% have public defender
offices, and 11% contract with private attorneys.63
Although Georgia has increased its expenditures on indigent defense
services in recent years, it still fails to provide adequate funding for those
services. In 1989, Georgia spent more than $14 million on indigent defense
services, with more than 90% of that money coming from counties and the
remainder from the state.' The state spends an average of $174.61 on each
58. See Peter Applebome, Study Faults Atlanta's System of Defending Poor, N.Y. TaMEs, Nov. 30,
1990, at B5.
59. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2562 (1990), district
court order vacated sub nom. Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618 (11 th Cir. 1991).
60. At least two cases seeking structural reform have succeeded in obtaining trial court orders requiring
reform of indigent defense services. See Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on jurisdic-
tional grounds, 481 F.2d 621 (2d. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974) (enjoining New York Legal
Aid Society from taking additional cases without judicial approval); Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757
(M.D. Fla. 1972) (issuing injunction to guarantee representation for criminal defendants in municipal court).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-31 (Michie 1990).
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-4 (Michie 1990).
63. Telephone Interview with Neal Bradley, plaintiffs' attorney in Luckey v. Harris (Sept. 24, 1990).
64. Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later, GA. COuNTY Gov'T, Apr. 1990, at 16.
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indigent defendant's case, ranking forty-fourth in the United States. 65 When
the Georgia legislature decided to contribute $1 million to the system in 1989,
it conditioned distribution of the money on county compliance with minimum
standards of adequate assistance of counsel.66 Not all counties applied for state
funding, and not all of those which received state funds complied with the
state's requirements. 67
Anecdotes and surveys demonstrate that Georgia is plagued with attorneys
who are forced to be "walking violations of the [S]ixth [A]mendment." 6 In
some counties, public defenders report that they have to represent hundreds of
clients. In the Fulton County Public Defender Office, which services the largest
county in Georgia, a recent report found that some public defenders each
represent more than 500 accused felons a year.69 The negative publicity gener-
ated by this report enabled the public defender office to obtain emergency funds
in the fall of 1990 and to receive an additional $470,000 in its 1991 budget.
70
Even with the additional funds, however, each defender will have a caseload
of at least 220 felony cases a year, a number that significantly exceeds the
maximum effective caseload standards suggested by professional legal organiza-
tions.
71
The resulting indigent defense system fails to pass constitutional muster
in at least two ways. First, it fails to provide representation to criminal defen-
dants at certain "critical stages"-including trials-in the adversary process.
A 1987 survey found that judges in at least eleven of the state's forty-five
judicial circuits do not provide counsel to indigent defendants charged with
misdemeanors, even charges that may lead to imprisonment, despite Argersinger
65. Id.
66. Stephen B. Bright et al., Keeping Gideon From Being Blown Away, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1990, at
10.
67. Jeanne Cummings, Council Gives $1 Million for Needy Defendants, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec.
9, 1989, at B 1. The guidelines require, for example, an attorney to meet with her client as soon as possible
after the client's arrest, preferably within 72 hours. They also require an appointed lawyer to be paid
between $35 and $45 per hour, about half of what a private attorney may charge, and prohibit fee caps on
death penalty cases. Id.
Only 119 of Georgia's 159 counties applied for state funds. The failure of counties to comply with
the guidelines has been noted by Ken Foskett in War on Drugs Takes Indigent Defense Hostage, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Oct. 7, 1990, at D10 (state money withheld from four counties for failing to appoint attorneys
within 50 hours of defendants' arrest); Trisha Renaud & Ann Woolner, Meet 'Em and Plead 'Em, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 8, 1990, at I (describing "slaughterhouse justice" system in which defense
attorneys plead as many clients' cases as possible at arraignment to keep Fulton County Public Defender
Office operational).
68. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
69. Spangenberg Report, supra note 40, at 27.
70. Trisha Renaud, PD Reforms: Double-Teaming, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 20, 1991, at
1.
71. Marguliessupra note 31, at 677. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, for example, estimates that an attorney can effectively represent 150 clients in a single year. Id.
(citing NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 29 (1973)).
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v. Hamlin's72 requirement that they do so.73
Second, lawyers are unable to investigate adequately their clients' cases.
Defense attorneys report that they routinely lack the time and resources to
interview their clients thoroughly and sometimes fail to interview relevant
witnesses in a case.74 The Fulton County report found that trial attorneys
sometimes "delay ordering investigations even when they feel that it may be
helpful to the defense, hoping that the case will result in a plea rather than go
to trial." 75
The Supreme Court once warned that the "denial of opportunity for ap-
pointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his
defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing
more than a formal compliance with the Constitution .... ,76 More specifical-
ly, federal appeals courts have held that the failure to investigate adequately
a client's case supports a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Coles
v. Peyton,77 the Fourth Circuit reversed an indigent defendant's rape conviction
because his appointed attorney failed to interview any relevant witnesses to the
crime, including the alleged victim and another possible suspect.
2. Luckey v. Miller
In response to the systemic deficiencies plaguing their state's indigent
defense system, attorneys in Georgia have been litigating a sweeping class
action to restructure the system by prospective injunction. 8 In 1986, the
Luckey plaintiffs, a class consisting of indigent persons who are or will be
charged with criminal offenses in Georgia courts and the attorneys who repre-
sent them, sued to vindicate indigents' Sixth Amendment rights. The lawsuit,
which is still pending, seeks to restructure Georgia's indigent defense system
by obtaining an injunction that would limit the number of cases an attorney
may handle, regulate the amount of compensation a court-appointed attorney
may receive, and set minimum standards necessary for a defense attorney to
provide effective assistance of counsel.79
72. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
73. Tracy Thompson, Rural Georgia's Poor Often Find Free Legal Aid Lacking, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Dec. 14, 1987, at Al; see also Lowrance v. State, 359 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 1987) (indigent criminal
defendant denied appointed counsel to contest misdemeanor charge).
74. Renaud & Woolner, supra note 67; Thompson, supra note 73.
75. Spangenberg Report, supra note 40, at 25-26.
76. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
77. 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). But see Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089,
1093 (4th Cir. 1970) (limiting Coles to cases in which there was "complete lack of investigation" by
counsel).
78. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2562 (1990), district
court order vacated sub nom. Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1991).
79. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 33-35, Luckey (No. C86-297R).
The plaintiffs have requested that the court instruct the state defendants to guarantee that indigent
criminal defendants be brought before a judicial officer within two or three days of their arrest and assigned
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The Luckey plaintiffs have encountered a number of jurisdictional obstacles
to adjudicating the merits of their case. The district court originally dismissed
the case for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted and for
violating the Eleventh Amendment's provision of sovereign immunity for the
states, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the
plaintiffs' case.80 More recently, the Eleventh Circuit approved the district
court's request to consider the question of the Younger abstention doctrine-the
principle that a federal court should refrain from interfering with a state court's
administration of its criminal justice system. 8 As this next section argues,
none of these jurisdictional issues-case or controversy, Younger doctrine, or
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity-warrants dismissal of the case prior
to adjudication on the merits.
a. Case or Controversy
The Article III "case or controversy" requirement has two related compo-
nents. 82 First, it requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that other remedies, such
as habeas corpus proceedings to challenge a conviction resulting from ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, are inadequate to address plaintiffs' claims. Second,
it mandates that plaintiffs show actual injury before a federal court can provide
injunctive relief.83 The district court in Luckey held that prospective injunctive
relief was inappropriate because plaintiffs had not shown that the Georgia
indigent defense system produced "across-the-board" violations of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, as Strickland requires.84
Yet Strickland should not apply to a request for prospective injunctive
relief. When the right to counsel has been deprived through systemic
error-such as when a defendant is denied counsel at a lineup or is represented
by an appointed attorney with a court-imposed conflict of interest in the
case-the rule requiring reversal is applied per se, without a factual inquiry.
"competent, effective" counsel at each critical stage in the prosecution. The plaintiffs have not sought a
specific compensation rate for appointed attorneys, but they have requested that the number of cases a public
defender handles not exceed "recognized minimum national standards." Id. at 34.
80. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012.
81. Luckey v. Miller, 929 E2d 618 (11th Cir. 1991) (vacating district court order).
82. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
83. In Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975), a case
strikingly similar to Luckey, indigent criminal defendants filed a class action to remedy inadequate funding
and excessive caseloads in the Florida Public Defender Offices. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned
that the case did not present a case or controversy, given the availability of state court remedies and federal
habeas corpus procedures. Id. at 715.
As the discussion of Younger abstention doctrine in Part II.B demonstrates, the availability of habeas
corpus does not present an adequate alternative for an indigent criminal defendant denied his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
84. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d at 1016-17.
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Strickland, in contrast, is the appropriate standard to apply when the defendant
alleges attorney error. 5
The Eleventh Circuit suggested Strickland's inapplicability when it reversed
the district court:
[D]eficiencies that do not meet the "ineffectiveness" standard may
nonetheless violate a defendant's rights under the [S]ixth [A]mendment.
In the post-trial context, such errors may be deemed harmless because
they did not affect the outcome of the trial. Whether an accused has
been prejudiced by the denial of a right is an issue that relates to
relief-whether the defendant is entitled to have his or her conviction
overturned-rather than to the question of whether sucfi a right exists
and can be protected prospectively.86
Two issues central to the case or controversy requirement are collapsed in
Judge Vance's opinion for the Eleventh Circuit. The first concerns the scope
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: outlining the scope of the right will
determine whether the defendant has been "harmed" by deprivation of the right.
For Judge Vance, the right to counsel protects more than just the outcome of
the defendant's case. In contrast, the Supreme Court, in its seminal right to
counsel cases, Strickland 87 and Cronic,8 has held that the right serves pri-
marily to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.89
Judge Vance's opinion cites three cases---Coleman v. Alabama,9" United
States v. Wade,91 and Gerstein v. Pugh92-- in which pretrial denial of the
right violated the Constitution, even though the defendants made no factual
showing of harm.93 These cases support the proposition that violations of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel may occur, even though the defendant does
not and need not demonstrate that denial of the right violates Strickland's
requirements.
If, as Judge Vance argues, systemic harms are cognizable, a second issue
arises concerning the availability of injunctive relief to address systemic harms.
For Judge Vance, the crucial distinction is timing-whether the defendant seeks
prospective or post-trial relief. In the three Supreme Court cases cited by Judge
Vance and noted in the preceding paragraph, the Supreme Court distinguished
between pre- and post-trial relief. Judge Vance explained that the Strickland
85. Margulies, supra note 31, at 715.
86. Luckey v. Harris, 860 E2d at 1017.
87. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
88. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
89. See id. at 654 ("ITlhe core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial."
(quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973)).
90. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
91. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
92. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
93. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's systemic approach to the right to counsel, dis-
cussed supra Part ll.A.
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factors--"concerns for finality, concern that extensive post-trial burdens would
discourage counsel from accepting cases, and concern for the independence of
counsel"-favor case-by-case analysis where a party seeks to overturn his or
her conviction and do not apply when only prospective relief is sought.94
Because the right to counsel is more than just the right to an outcome, and
because the Luckey plaintiffs seek a prospective injunction to prevent future
harm, they should only be required to demonstrate threatened injury, as Judge
Vance argues. Imposing the Strickland criteria on the entire class of Luckey
plaintiffs would be too stringent. The allegations in Luckey clearly present a
''case or controversy."
b. Younger Abstention Doctrine
The Younger abstention doctrine raises another jurisdictional issue. The
doctrine prevents federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecu-
tions (the narrow reading) and from engaging in a major continuing intrusion
into state criminal proceedings (the broad reading).95 The Younger doctrine
has two justifications. It "is based in part on the view that the state judicial pro-
ceeding provides an adequate alternative forum to resolve the issues sought to
be litigated in the federal court."96 It also derives from the Court's commit-
ment to "Our Federalism"-the view that "the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways. 97
Thus, the Luckey plaintiffs and other litigants seeking a structural injunction
to improve indigent defense services must address both prongs of the Younger
doctrine. The narrow reading dictates that the federal court not interfere with
an ongoing state criminal prosecution. This objection is easily addressed-the
relief requested in Luckey is systemic and would not intervene in any current
criminal prosecutions. Luckey focuses on improving the state's indigent defense
institutions-a separate sphere-while leaving intact the state's laws and
apparatus for prosecuting criminal defendants.9"
94. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied 110 S.Ct. 2562 (1990), district
court order vacated sub. nom. Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also
Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834, 845-46 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 481 F.2d 621 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974) (discussing pre-and post-trial relief).
95. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (197 1); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 715, 744-49 (1978).
96. Frug, supra note 95, at 745.
97. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
98. The Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may order systemic reform of state criminal
procedures that are not directly involved in a prosecution. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),
plaintiffs filed a civil rights class action challenging Florida's practice of detaining persons before trial on
the basis of a prosecutor's information without ajudicial determination of probable cause. The district court
held for the plaintiffs and eventually issued a detailed final order changing pretrial procedures. Id. at 108.
Although the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court on the merits, and reversed and remanded
the case for additional proceedings, it noted that the lower court did have the power to enter such an order.
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The broad reading of the Younger doctrine, which prevents federal courts
from overseeing state criminal proceedings, presents a more difficult hurdle.
In the Sixth Amendment right to counsel context, however, at least one federal
district court has held that the plaintiffs' need for relief may overcome Younger
abstention concerns. In Gilliard v. Carson,9 9 the court issued an injunction to
guarantee that indigent criminal defendants in a Jacksonville municipal court
were appointed attorneys in a manner consistent with Argersinger v.
Hamlin.t°
Neither justification for the Younger abstention doctrine persuaded the
Gilliard court to stay its hand. First, it found the alternative remedy of petition-
ing for a writ of habeas corpus "manifestly inadequate" because the defendant
could not obtain it until after she had suffered the irreparable injury of denial
of the right to counsel. 01' Moreover, the court found the constitutional injury
suffered by the Jacksonville criminal defendants more compelling than the
federalism concerns protected by the Younger doctrine. 02
When weighing an individual's interest in vindicating his constitutional
rights against the state's interest in preserving its sovereignty, it is instructive
to recall the language of Mitchum v. Foster,t 3 decided the same year as
Gilliard" The very purpose of Section 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."'"'
Even though the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have eviscerated this vision
of Reconstruction federalism,0 5 which posits that federal courts are the prima-
ry guardians of federal rights, Gilliard at least stands for the proposition that
federal injunctive relief is warranted if the state's practices threaten to deprive
many defendants of their federal constitutional rights and other remedies are
inadequate to correct these practices."0 6 Comity does not allow states to pre-
The Younger abstention doctrine was not a bar to relief, the Court said, because "[tlhe injunction was not
directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial
hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution." Id. at 108 n.9; see also
Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to
Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 296-98 (1976)
(discussing Gerstein and Younger doctrine).
99. 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
100. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
101. Gilliard, 348 F. Supp. at 762. The court also noted that the plaintiff has the option to choose
whether to sue in state or federal court to vindicate her constitutional rights. Id. at 762 n.3.
102. Id. at 762; see also Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 506-09
(M.D. Ala. 1976) (issuing injunction to guarantee indigent defendants' right to counsel despite Younger
abstention concerns).
103. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
104. Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
105. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
106. See also Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834, 847 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds,
481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974) ("Where there is a present violation of
constitutional rights, the hope of delayed correction by the state (or the city) should not stay the hand of
a federal district court.").
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vent indigent criminal defendants from vindicating their Sixth Amendment
rights.
c. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
Whereas the Younger abstention doctrine addresses the federalism concerns
between state and federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment issue raises federal-
ism concerns between states' political branches and federal courts.107 The
Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to prohibit a citizen from directly
suing the state. However, as Luckey demonstrates, litigation to restructure
indigent defense systems involves suing not the state itself, but the state
officials who fund and administer the system. Ex Parte Young 0 3 allows state
officers to be sued to prevent them from engaging in unconstitutional conduct
in their official capacities.10 9 The district court in Luckey held Ex Parte Young
inapplicable because any remedial order compelling indigent defense funding
would be enforced against the state itself rather than against the officials who
were the defendants in the lawsuit.110 However, as the Eleventh Circuit noted
in its reversal of the district court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
lawsuits to compel state officials to comply with the Constitution in the future,
regardless of how much the order would cost the state."'
III. STRUCTURING THE REMEDY TO IMPROVE
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
To summarize: the legal arguments against a federal court's issuing a
structural injunction to reform a failing indigent defense system are not persua-
sive. Courts have the legal authority to evaluate the constitutionality of state
systems responsible for providing essential services to its citizens and, if
necessary, to require the state legislature to raise money to bring the system
Another route around the Younger abstention doctrine, suggested by Zeigler and pursued by the
plaintiffs in Luckey, is to sue for prospective relief. Zeigler, supra note 98, at 298. The Younger doctrine
does not apply when criminal prosecution is only a possibility. Id. Such an approach encounters standing
problems, however, as plaintiffs are required by O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), to demonstrate that they are likely to be injured in the future by
the practices they seek to challenge. See Margulies, supra note 31, at 718-24. The Supreme Court has
relaxed this standing requirement of likelihood of future injury in certain institutional reform cases, such
as the Arkansas prison litigation, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), and the Florida pretrial detention
case, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
107. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
108. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
109. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
110. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir. 1988).
111. Id.; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. at 289, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)
(requiring state officials to spend money, as ancillary effect of court order, is "often an inevitable conse-
quence of the principle announced in Ex Parte Young"), Frug, supra note 95, at 751-52.
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into compliance with the Constitution." 2 A description of the Arkansas prison
litigation, which is literally a textbook example of judicial reform of a constitu-
tionally infirm state institution, illuminates the dynamics of institutional reform
through the structural injunction."'
A. The Legal Case for the Structural Injunction
The structural injunction is a court's remedial tool to reform an entire state
institution in order to bring it into compliance with the Constitution. It requires
a judge to maintain an ongoing relationship with the institution as she supervis-
es its reconstruction."4 The need for institutional transformation motivates
a judge's decision to oversee its reorganization. In Hutto v. Finney,"5 the
Arkansas prison litigation, the plaintiffs presented detailed evidence that the
prison was "a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world."" 6
Confronted with extensive violations of the prisoners' constitutional rights in
a number of areas-such as the lack of safe and sanitary living conditions and
the unconstitutional use of isolation cells to punish prisoners-the court initially
required the state to address the deficient conditions.
117
As time progressed, prison administrators addressed the problems in piece-
meal fashion. The court oversaw the reforms by holding hearings to monitor
the improvements and by issuing orders for more detailed instructions to the
prison administrators." 8 Through the structural injunction, the court promoted
institutional reform by supervising the prison administrators, focusing public
attention on the need for prison reform, and prodding the legislature to increase
its funding of the prison system. The State of Arkansas' corrections expendi-
tures increased at least sixfold after the court's intervention." 9 The Arkansas
prison litigation illustrates the dynamics involved in using the structural injunc-
112. See Robert A. Schapiro, Note, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional
Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231 (1989) (arguing court order requiring legislature to raise funds is
consistent with judicial review).
113. OWEN M. FiSS & DOUG REnDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 529-752 (2d ed. 1984) (presenting excerpts
of primary decisions in ongoing-and over a decade long-litigation to reform Arkansas' prisons).
114. Fs, supra note 12, at 92.
115. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
116. Id. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt I1)). The case
history is summarized in Robert E. Easton, Note, The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99 YALE L.J.
1983, 1998 n.62 (1990).
117. Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt 1).
118. Holt II, 309 F. Supp. 362 (declaring certain prison practices---"trusty" guard system, open
barracks, isolation cells, and inadequate rehabilitation program-unconstitutional and requiring structural
reform), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (Holt I11)
(maintaining prior decrees); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (finding constitutional
violations in medical treatment, living conditions, and certain disciplinary procedures), aff'd, 548 F.2d 740
(8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
119. Malcolm M. Feeley, The Significance of Prison Conditions Cases: Budgets and Regions, 23 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 273, 274 (1989).
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tion and demonstrates its capacity for improving constitutionally infirm state
institutions.
As in the prison example, additional funding is essential to improving
indigent defense systems. Some political officials, such as the Governor of
Georgia, who is a defendant in Luckey, insist that the legislature has the
prerogative to decide how to spend state funds. 2 Yet, as the description of
Georgia's indigent defense system demonstrates, the legislature seems unlikely
to pursue vigorously adequate funding of indigent defense systems. Legislatures
are, after all, majoritarian institutions, whereas the beneficiaries of indigent
defense systems are minorities-not only numerically, but economically and
often ethnically as well.' Moreover, "[p]roviding effective assistance, espe-
cially at state expense, is widely regarded as assisting criminals in crime."'"
Some reformers suggest that the legal profession should increase its pro
bono commitment by furnishing attorneys for indigent criminal defendants when
the state lacks the resources to do so.23 Depending on the jurisdiction, the
attorney may either receive compensation for her services or have to provide
representation without compensation. During the last decade, a majority of
states have decided that compulsory pro bono service is inappropriate. 2 4 Even
in states where compensation is required, however, the money provided may
amount to a pittance and thus discourage the assigned attorney from vigorously
representing her client."a
Other reformers, such as Professor Klein, advocate raising money from
within the legal profession to fund improvements in the system. Klein proposes
allocating funds collected from lawyer registration fees to indigent defense
services, as well as drawing on funds collected from Interest on Lawyer Trust
Accounts (IOLTA). t 26 State criminal justice systems have embraced these
reforms with varying degrees of enthusiasm.'27
120. Brief for Appellees at 15-22, Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988) (No. 88-8047).
121. Brief for Respondent at 39, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (No. 82-660).
122. Id. at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
123. Anderson, supra note 10, at 531 ("system of uncompensated court appointment of counsel is
constitutionally sound" although Constitution imposes some limits).
124. American Bar Association, Section of Criminal Justice, Report to the House of Delegates, app.
B at 7-8 (Aug. 1990) (unpublished report, on file with author); see. e.g., State v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan.
1987).
125. See, e.g., Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.). cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) (statutory
limit of $500 on funds for expenses incurred in defense of indigent defendant does not violate Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel).
126. Klein, supra note 9, at 683-92. According to Professor Klein:
Lawyers had traditionally placed in aggregated, non-interest bearing accounts, those client funds
held in trust for future use which were either so small in amount or expected to be held for such
short duration that they could not be invested productively on behalf of the client. Since the
funds belonged to the clients until needed for the specific transaction, the lawyer was not
permitted to receive any interest on the funds.
Id. at 688-89. IOLTA programs pool attorney trust accounts to generate interest income to help fund public
interest causes, such as subsidizing civil legal services programs. Id. at 689.
127. Spangenberg, supra note 26, at 12 (surveying recent indigent defense reforms and concluding that
"available resources to respond to... present demands are sadly lacking").
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When legislative appropriations prove insufficient and private strategies fail
to increase funds, the federal judiciary has the authority, indeed the obligation,
to bring a deficient state system of defense services into compliance with the
Constitution.' s The judiciary retains this authority even when its remedial
order will require the legislature to appropriate additional funds. 29
B. The Pragmatic Case for the Structural Injunction
Based on evaluations ofjudicial intervention to reform various state bureau-
cracies-schools, prisons, and mental hospitals-since the 1960's,' 30 critics
of the structural injunction offer prudential as well as legal objections to broad
judicial remedial orders. However, institutional differences suggest that criti-
cisms of the structural injunction are less applicable to indigent defense sys-
tems. First, as discussed earlier, prison reform has been successful. Second, an
indigent defense system is more open, and thus more amenable to judicial
reform, than a prison. Finally, because the state's indigent defense system is
a legal institution, a federal district court is uniquely qualified to oversee the
state system.
Professor Schuck argues that courts often lack comprehensive knowledge
of the institutions they seek to reform. 31 This argument is unpersuasive in
the ineffective assistance of counsel context, however, for judges have the
knowledge and experience to evaluate the efficiency of indigent defense
systems. Schuck also argues that the judge's isolation from the institution and
her reliance on secondary sources for information-pleadings and monitors'
and masters' reports-prevent her from effectively responding to the peculiar
dynamics of the litigation.132 However, because criminal defense attorneys
operate in public forums with outside officials-in hearings and trials before
judges, in communications with prosecutors regarding plea bargains and
discovery-reforming a state's indigent defense system does not present the
same informational barriers as does reforming closed institutions such as prisons
and mental hospitals. 133
The same qualities that prevent the court from understanding and learning
about the institution it seeks to improve, Schuck argues, hamper it from promot-
128. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("Judicial authority
enters only when a local authority defaults.").
129. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1665 (1990) (court can order local government body to levy
taxes).
130. See id. Empirical evaluations of structural reform include Note, Implementation Problems in.
InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977) (describing limits of structural reform), and
Diane S. Kaplan & Richard M. Zuckerman, Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree
Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1367-69 (1975) (discussing results of Alabama mental
hospital litigation).
131. SCHUCK, supra note 12, at 154-69.
132. Id.
133. Telephone Interview with Neal Bradley, plaintiffs' attorney in Luckey v. Harris (Nov. 3, 1990).
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ing institutional reform. For instance, the judge's isolation limits communication
of her reform proposals to the institution's employees-a "leakage of authority"
occurs as the judge's instructions filter through the bureaucracy, frustrating
implementation of the reforms.134 Similarly, Schuck argues that the court,
possessing only the formal power to coerce and the informal influence of moral
legitimacy, lacks the tools to induce bureaucratic change and to garner political
support for institutional reform.135
In short, criticisms of the structural injunction refer to complex institutions
that require close supervision and have less relevance for institutions such as
indigent defense systems, which are relatively open and decentralized. As a
legal body, the court can adopt a straightforward set of rules to address indigent
defense deficiencies, enabling prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges
to understand their own legal obligations.
C. Structuring the Remedial Decree
A court that reaches the merits of a case seeking structural reform of the
state's indigent defense system and rules in the indigent defendants' favor will
have to devise a remedial scheme. Courts in other institutional reform cases
have employed a variety of techniques for overseeing bureaucratic improve-
ments and for compelling the legislature to increase funding for a state agency.
1. Declaratory Judgment
Using this mechanism, the district court would simply declare that the
state's indigent system fails to provide effective assistance of counsel as
required by the Sixth Amendment. The court would allow the governor and the
legislature to propose and to implement the changes necessary to bring the
system into compliance with the Constitution. If the political branches view the
court's decision as legitimate, then the declaratory judgment can be an effective
tool for raising funds.13 6 Of course, this remedy succeeds only to the extent
that the governor and the legislature agree to reform the indigent defense
system in response to the court's adjudication. To vindicate the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, some state courts have issued declaratory judgments to
reform statutory schemes for compensating private attorneys who represent
indigent criminal defendants. Such judgments have generally resulted in greater
funding for those attorneys.
137
134. SCHIUCK, supra note 12, at 161 (footnote omitted).
135. Id. at 167-69.
136. Id. at 191.
137. The court in Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972), stating that "[tihe proper duty of the
judiciary... is neither to enforce laws nor appropriate money," simply issued a declaratory judgment that
Kentucky's system of court-appointed uncompensated counsel was unconstitutional. Id. at 299; see also State
ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (W. Va. 1976) (state statutes requiring private attorneys to
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Although the declaratory judgment has been effective in resolving straight-
forward issues such as the constitutionality of compensation statutes and might
be effective in raising funds, it would not provide the political branches with
the comprehensive and ongoing guidance in addressing the various deficiencies
needed to bring the system into compliance with the Constitution. Indeed, even
though many legislators and executive branch officials have legal training,
138
they are not as experienced and knowledgeable as judges are in developing
remedial schemes to improve indigent defense systems.
2. Injunction with Reform Guidelines
In addition to issuing a judgment declaring the system unconstitutional, as
in the first scenario, the court could issue a series of guidelines governing the
provision of indigent defense services. It would then maintain jurisdiction over
the lawsuit to provide more specific instructions as necessary to ensure that the
state's political branches bring the indigent defense system into compliance with
the Constitution. The guidelines could (and should) establish standards by
setting a limit on the number of cases handled by a public defender, by requir-
ing a minimum number of investigators to be assigned to each public defender,
and by assuring that private attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants
receive adequate compensation. If the defendant demonstrates error due to
funding and resource deficiencies, the court would view the harm as state-im-
posed error, which would require automatic reversal of the conviction unless
the error was harmless.
At least one Sixth Amendment right to counsel case dealt with remedies
in this manner. In State v. Smith, 139 the Arizona Supreme Court found that
Mohave County's bid system failed to consider four factors in awarding
criminal defense contracts: (1) the amount of time the attorney is expected to
spend representing indigent defendants; (2) the support costs for the attorney;
(3) the attorney's competence; and (4) the complexity of each case. Holding
that this failure created an inference that the system produced inadequate
representation, 40 the court required the county to follow a series of guidelines
in order to maintain a contract defense system. The county's failure to comply
with those guidelines would result in the reversal of any conviction obtained
under the system and appealed by the defendant, unless the state could demon-
strate that the error was harmless.
spend "substantial amount" of time representing indigent defendants without compensation is unconstitutional
taking of property). On the beneficial effect such lawsuits have had on raising funds for defense services,
see Wilson, Litigative Approaches, supra note 12, at 209.
138. For a discussion of the pervasive presence of lawyers in government, see Michael Kinsley, Now
You're Thinking Like a Lawyer, WASH. MONTHLY, Feb. 1989, at 44.
139. 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
140. Id. at 1381.
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The decision prompted Mohave County to begin paying appointed counsel
on an hourly basis to represent indigent defendants, an action that increased the
county's expenditure on defense services and improved the quality of represen-
tation in the county.141 On the model of Smith, injunctive guidelines for the
reform of indigent defense systems would ensure that the system operates to
provide effective assistance of counsel-that the attorneys handle a manageable
number of cases, are given adequate resources, and receive adequate compensa-
tion. Besides favoring the Smith guidelines model, this Note also endorses the
Smith approach of harmless error review on appeal. One reformer has argued
that the Smith court should have adopted a per se rule preventing prosecutions
in Mohave County until the defense counsel system was in compliance with
the Constitution.'42 However, Smith's harmless error standard ensures that the
criminal justice system continues to operate while the state attempts to comply
with the injunction, and avoids the Younger abstention concerns that would
arise from a federal court order temporarily freezing the state's criminal prose-
cution system. 143
Perhaps more important than the specific relief ordered by the court is the
process by which it administers the decree. The Arkansas prison litigation
suggests that the court should initially formulate specific goals regarding the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and then allow the political branches to
attempt to meet these goals. The Smith court adopted this approach by establish-
ing standards while not precisely dictating the way in which Mohave County
should improve its contract defense system.
By setting goals for the operation of indigent defense systems, judicial
application of the structural injunction would promote gradual reform. For
instance, the court could order the legislature to establish a reasonable rate of
compensation for appointed attorneys and could allow it to allocate the neces-
sary funds. If the legislature failed to establish an adequate compensation
scheme, the court could then determine the compensation rate and order the
legislature to provide adequate funds.
In effect, the structural injunction would penalize the state for its inadequate
indigent defense institutions by making convictions more difficult to obtain until
the system was reformed. The attention generated by implementing the guide-
lines would focus systematic attention on ineffective assistance of counsel, so
that state court judges, public defenders, and even prosecutors would be likely
to address the problem. The guidelines-for example, a simple judicial order
requiring counsel at all critical stages in the prosecution-would clearly instruct
state judges in criminal cases on how to deal with denial of effective assistance
of counsel. Issuing an injunction with guidelines also likely would increase
141. Caroline A. Pilch, Note, State v. Smith: Placing A Limit On Lawyers' Caseloads, 27 ARIZ. L.
REv. 759, 767-68 (1985).
142. See Margulies, supra note 31, at 712-14.
143. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
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funding for indigent defense services. The structural injunction has proven to
be an effective tool for pressuring political officials to increase funding for
constitutionally deficient state institutions.1" Judicial oversight of the institu-
tion provides its managers with leverage to obtain additional funding. 145 The
effect of a detailed judicial order demanding reform of the state's indigent
defense system, then, may be to require the state's political branches to spend
more money than they otherwise would.1 46 In summary, judicial guidelines
and the public attention generated by their implementation would enable
indigent criminal defendants denied adequate representation to assert more
effectively their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
If the political branches default on their responsibility, the court should
issue a more detailed order to instruct the political branches on how to bring
the indigent defense system into compliance with the Constitution. In its effort
to restructure the state's indigent defense system, such a multifaceted order
would raise Younger abstention concerns. 47 These concerns would be mitigat-
ed by the observation that the court was not initially very intrusive-at first,
it simply set goals-and only interfered with the state's discretion when it had
good cause to do so. More generally, as noted in the discussion of Gilliard, the
need to remedy widespread constitutional injury to the right to counsel justifies
setting aside Younger's federalism concerns.1 48 Within the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel context, then, a structural injunction with reform guidelines
could focus the political branches' attention and resources on the problem and
provide them with direction toward a solution.
149
144. Frug, supra note 95; Feeley, supra note 119; cf. William A. Taggart, Redefining the Power of
the Federal Judiciary: The Impact of Court-Ordered Prison Reform on State Expenditures for Corrections,
23 LAW & Soc'y REV. 241, 266 (1989) (concluding "[flederal courts have played a limited, if sometimes
very significant, role in shaping state expenditures").
145. James M. Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is: Remedies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural
Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1822 (1984); Kaplan & Zuckerman, supra note 131, at 1367-68.
146. Hirschhorn, supra note 145, at 1823 (citing court orders requiring additional funding despite
opposition of political actors).
147. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
143. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
149. Another possible remedy is to have the court order the legislature to levy taxes. After Missouri
v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), it is clear that "a court order directing a local government body to levy
its own taxes [to comply with the Constitution] is plainly ajudicial act within the power of a federal court."
Id. at 1665. A court order authorizing a tax to raise money is appealing because of its directness in
addressing problems stemming from inadequacy of funds. However, such an order would likely be
unnecessary, since the promulgation of guidelines would lead naturally to taxation or, at least, redirected
spending. In addition, such an order might stiffen resistance by the political branches to the court's objective.
Although courts may command authority on legal issues such as the relationship between indigent defense
systems and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, they lack the experience and expertise to design and
to implement tax increases. Id. at 1667, 1672-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Frug, supra note 95 at 740.
Political officials would probably resist this intrusion into the sphere of their expertise more than they would
resistjudicial reform. Furthermore, such an approach, like a simple declaratory judgment, would fail to guide
the political branches on how to restructure their indigent defense system to comply with the Constitution.
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CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires effective assistance of
counsel. Inadequate funding denies lawyers who represent indigent criminal
defendants the time and the resources to provide competent representation. As
a result, their clients are unable to vindicate their constitutional rights. The
existing legal remedy for such deficiencies, post-conviction review of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims, fails to address the systemic deficiencies
plaguing indigent defense systems and thus overlooks the cases in which
inadequate representation led to unfair conviction. When political institutions
do not adequately fund defense services, courts have the constitutional obliga-
tion and authority to provide injunctive relief to address the resulting deficien-
cies. Indeed, because of their legal expertise, courts are uniquely qualified to
issue guidelines for administering indigent defense systems in order to bring
those systems into compliance with the Constitution.
